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Discussion of public employee bargaining must begin with
recognition of the fundamental differences between public and private
employment. The terms and conditions of employment in the private
sector are determined by private decisions made by private parties shaped
by market forces. In the public sector, the terms and conditions of
employment are public decisions made through governmental officials and
shaped by political processes as well as by market forces. In a democratic
society, this means that decisions are confined by constitutional limitations
and must ultimately reflect the will of the electorate.
1. PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT AND PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT
Public employment is constitutionally protected. In Pickering v.
Board of Education,' the Supreme Court held that a teacher's public
criticism of the school board was a constitutionally-protected exercise of
free speech. In Elrod v. Burns,' the Court held that dismissal of a deputy
sheriff because of his political affiliation was a denial of his constitutional
right of freedom of assembly. In the private sector, there is no
constitutional protection, and some state courts have held that the discharge
of employees for similar conduct is not protected because it is contrary to
public policy.' Many public employees are protected by civil service
systems that prohibit discharge or other adverse action without good cause
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and proper procedure. Meanwhile, private employees can be summarily
discharged for good cause, bad cause, or no cause at all. Public
employment is not at will; it is considered a property right.
In public employment, many terms and conditions of employment
such as pensions, health insurance, and length of the school year are
prescribed by statute, not subject to either individual or collective
bargaining. In the private sector, the same subjects are determined by free
collective bargaining.
II. FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PUBLIC SECTOR AND PRIVATE
SECTOR BARGAINING
The differences between public and private employee individual
bargaining over the terms and conditions of employment are significant,
but they pale in comparison to the fundamental difference between public
and private sector collective bargaining. The focus of this article is on
municipal employee bargaining because the differences in this area are
more sharply drawn.
A public employee collective agreement is more than a contract; it is
an instrument of government and a product of government decision
making. It directly determines the terms and conditions that the
governmental entity must provide, and it establishes the administrative
structure and procedure to implement and enforce that government
decision. But it does much more. A public employee collective agreement
indirectly determines the level of taxes every person must pay and the level
of government service every person will enjoy.4
Private sector collective bargaining is private decision making,
concerned with the costs and benefits of the private parties to the
agreement. The private parties have little or no concern for the interest or
welfare of the public. They have little concern for the welfare of their
customers beyond keeping them satisfied. Their focus is economic, each
seeking to maximize their private interest.
Public employee bargaining is public decision making concerned
primarily with the public interest, or more concretely, the desires of the
electorate. The parties have little concern with the product market, for the
public employer is largely immune from competition since the customers
(residents) cannot readily move to another supplier. The focus is on the
level of service the public wants and what taxes the public is willing to pay
as expressed through the political process.
Private sector bargaining is primarily an economic process where
4. For a more complete development of this point of view, see Clyde Summers, Public
Employee Bargaining: A Political Respective, 84 YALE L.J. 1156 (1974).
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market forces frame the outcomes mainly by determining what costs the
product market will bear. Public sector bargaining is a political process
where the outcome is framed by political forces, like the taxes voters are
willing to bear and the curtailment of services they will tolerate. In local
government, labor costs make up seventy percent of government
expenditures, so the focus is inevitably on the budget, the city's most
important political decision.
III. THE STRUCTURE OF BARGAINING
The most significant difference in the structure of bargaining is who
sits at the table and who sits behind the bargainers with the authority to
make the agreement binding. On the union side there is no significant
difference between public sector and private sector bargaining. In both
cases, negotiation is done by officers of the union or a negotiating
committee. They may have the authority to make a binding agreement and
can give a final answer at the bargaining table, though in many unions the
agreement must be ratified by the members.
On the management side there is a crucial difference. In the private
sector those at the table frequently have the authority to make a binding
agreement; they can give a final answer at the bargaining table. The
agreement need not be ratified by the stockholders, or, in most cases, by the
corporate board. In public employment this is normally not the case, for
those at the bargaining table often have no authority to commit the funds
required by the contract. Expenditures can normally be authorized only by
the legislative body, which makes up the budget and levies the taxes.
Often, neither the mayor nor any member of the city council even sits on
the bargaining committee. This may not cause problems because the
negotiators may know what the mayor and city council will approve, or the
negotiators may simultaneously negotiate with them behind the scenes to
gain their approval. However, the gap between those who negotiate and
those who provide the funds invites the intrusion of political differences
that may go beyond the amount of funds requested and lead to an impasse.
In Philadelphia, collective bargaining for the schools is the
responsibility of the board of education, but the board has no taxing
authority and must go to the city council to get the necessary funds. This
has, on occasion, led to political conflict and near crisis. When such an
impasse occurs, the board of education may be forced to trim its budget,
thereby reducing the educational quality of the schools. The alternative is
to repudiate the contract. In Philadelphia Federation of Teachers v.
Thomas,5 the board of education signed a two-year contract with increases
5. 436 A.2d 1228, 1229 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981). See Stephen Befort, Public Sector
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in the second year. The city council refused to appropriate the amount
necessary for the second year increase, so the board unilaterally rescinded
the increase. The commonwealth court upheld the board's action on the
reasoning that the promised increase was subject to an implied condition
precedent that adequate funding would be forthcoming.6 This is a potential
problem in each of the bargaining units of the city since the department
heads sit at the bargaining table while the council controls the budget.
This problem is aggravated if the collective agreement is not
concluded before the budget is adopted. The law specifies when the budget
must be adopted and frequently specifies when the collective bargaining
procedures are to be concluded so that the costs of the collective agreement
are known before the budget is finalized. This is more often hoped for than
realized. In practice, the budget deadline is more rigid than the bargaining
deadline. As a result, the budget is often adopted before negotiations are
concluded. This significantly limits the chances that negotiators will get a
supplemental appropriation or will squeeze funds from other lines in the
departmental budgets.
Another less-marked difference in the structure of bargaining is that
most private employers have only one or two bargaining units, partly
because many of their employees are not organized. When there are
multiple units, they may engage in coalition bargaining or follow pattern
bargaining with the negotiators in one unit setting the pace for the whole
process. In public employee bargaining, multiple units are the rule, often
with each department bargaining separately. If the board of education has
independent taxing power, the board will have at least three bargaining
units-teachers, principals, and non-teaching personnel-each of which is
largely independent. New York City has 200 bargaining units, and smaller
municipalities will have anywhere from six to sixteen units. Pattern
bargaining is fragmented because there are normally at least four quite
independent patterns: public security (police and firefighters), education
(teachers and principals), professional employees, and all of the remaining
employees. Patterns established in one group may not carry over to other
groups, but gains by one group impact other groups because the money
comes out of the same purse. Bargaining becomes similar to the process of
herding cats.
IV. SUBJECTS OF BARGAINING
Public employee bargaining statutes originally followed the federally-
developed law on mandatory subjects of bargaining, but it eventually
Bargaining: Fiscal Crisis and Unilateral Change, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1221, 1236 (1985).
6. Id. at 1232.
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became widely recognized that the scope of bargaining in the public sector
should be narrower, and a "balancing test" evolved. Exactly what was to
be balanced was not illuminated. Typical language included whether the
subject was a matter of "inherent management policy," or "natural
management prerogative" which "intimately and directly affects the work
and welfare of the employee" or which "significantly interferes with the
exercise of inherent prerogative," or "an essential element of the right to
manage affairs," or whether the subject "falls closer to wages, hours and
conditions of employment on the continuum or falls closer to the core of
management discretion."
This balancing test is stated with characteristic ambiguity in a
Pennsylvania statute. First, section 701 of the Pennsylvania Public
Employee Bargaining statute7 copies section 8(d) of the National Labor
Relations Act. Then section 702 provides:
Public employers shall not be required to bargain over matters of
inherent managerial policy, which shall include but shall not be
limited to such areas of discretion or policy as the functions and
programs of the public employer, standards of services, its
overall budget, utilization of technology, the organizational
structure and selection, and direction of personnel. 8
Such language provides no compass to the labor boards or the courts;
it points to no helpful rationale for a different scope of bargaining in the
public and private sector except that "the employer is the government,"
with no explanation of why that should make a difference. The matter is
left at sea with no guidance except for the boards' or the courts' intuition.
If we inquire more directly into why it should make a difference that
the employee is the government, we may still be at sea, but in sight of land.
In Ridgefield Park Education Association v. Ridgefield Park Board of
Education,9 the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that public
employee bargaining was public decision making, and therefore pointed
toward the consideration of keeping the political process open in making
these governmental decisions. The court, in holding that the transfer and
assignment of teachers was not bargainable, said:
There would be little room for community involvement if
agreements concerning educational policy matters could be
negotiated behind closed doors. . . . A private employer may
bargain away as much or as little of its managerial control as it
likes. However, the very foundation of representative democracy
would be endangered if decisions on significant matters of
governmental policy were left to the process of collective
7. 43 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 1101.701 (West 1991).
8. 43 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 1101.702 (West 1991).
9. 393 A.2d 278, 285 (N.J. 1978).
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negotiation, where citizen participation is precluded.'0
In a later case, the New Jersey court was more explicit: "Matters of
public policy are properly decided, not by negotiation and arbitration, but
by the political process. This involves the panoply of democratic
institutions and practices, including public debate, lobbying, voting,
legislation and administration.""
If we start with the proposition that public employee bargaining is a
process of governmental decision making, we can compare the political
process when certain decisions affecting terms and conditions of
employment are made without collective bargaining and how that political
process is changed by collective bargaining. This will then give us some
guidance as to the proper subjects for bargaining.
Consider, for example, the political process when the question is
whether the salaries of the teachers should be raised. In the absence of
collective bargaining, individual teachers or teacher organizations will try
to persuade the board of education by petition, discussion, or attendance at
school board meetings to provide for an increase in the next year's school
budget. When the budget is presented at a public hearing, the teachers,
perhaps reinforced by parents or the PTA, will argue for the fairness and
the need for an increase. Taxpayers, individual and organized, will argue
against the increase and protest the level of taxes the increase will require.
The board will retire to an executive session to decide, and if it is an
elected board that has taxing power, the board will be held accountable at
the next election.
Consider other questions that affect terms and conditions of
employment such as class size. The process will be much the same, with
perhaps more vigorous advocacy by the parents and PTA, but with less
vigorous advocacy, or none, by the taxpayers who may not recognize the
impact this decision will have on their tax rate. Consider also the question
of school discipline such as expulsion, suspension, or corporal punishment.
Both the teachers and the parents will have divided views and the taxpayers
will be largely unconcerned. The board's decisions in all of these cases
will be shaped by weighing the articulated views of these, and perhaps
other, interest groups.
Now consider the political process if any of these subjects are matters
for collective bargaining. The union, selected by the majority of teachers,
will determine what demands to make by weighing the interests of the
teachers. The board will weigh its interests against what it believes the
parents and taxpayers want. The two parties will then go into a room from
10. Id. at 287.
11. Local 195, IFPTE, AFL-CIO v. State of New Jersey, 443 A.2d 187, 191 (N.J.
1982).
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which all other interested parties are excluded. The board will be
confronted directly by the union's demands with no equivalent articulate
counter-pressure from other interested groups. Once the agreement has
been made at the bargaining table, it is difficult to block it at the ratification
stage unless it has substantial impact on the budget. This gives the union,
as the representative of the teachers, a larger and more effective voice in
the decision than if there was no collective bargaining. It largely precludes
the voters from having an effective voice. The effect of collective
bargaining is to significantly change the political process, removing
subjects of bargaining from effective public discussion.
This alteration of the political processes is not necessarily bad; it
depends on the particular subject for decision. For some decisions, the
normal political processes may create an imbalance between competing
political forces. When decisions are made concerning economic terms and
conditions of employment such as salaries, medical benefits, or pensions
which have a direct impact on the budget and taxes, public employees are
at a distinct political disadvantage in the normal political processes. The
voters, like all employers and customers, want the maximum level of
services at the lowest cost. Their economic interests are in direct conflict
with the union's economic demands. Taxes are the most sensitive issue,
and the taxpayers have far more votes. Although public employees may
have political weight beyond their numbers, they are politically
overwhelmed when the issue is the budget and taxes. They need the
advantages they gain through collective bargaining to offset the voters'
effective voice in determining the budget and taxes.
The same justification for collective bargaining may not apply to other
subjects of bargaining. Collective bargaining concerning discipline,
seniority, or job assignments in the public works department may have
quite a different rationalization. The taxpayer has little interest because
these problems will have no visible budget impact. But employees and
management have very strong and adversary interests. Joint decision
making by the two parties in interest would seem an appropriate manner of
managing.
Compare the process when the issue is discipline of students through
suspension, expulsion, or corporal punishment as decided by the collective
bargaining process. These are not matters of importance to taxpayers, but
they are of vital concern to the teachers and to parents. Settling these
issues behind closed doors, with no participation by the parents, blocks out
a major interested group.
This process, however, raises a more serious question because under
the rule of exclusive representation, the union speaks for all employees
whether they agree or not. When economic terms such as salaries, health
insurance, and pensions are bargained for, the teachers will be unanimous
20031
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in wanting more benefits, though they may have different views as to how
the money should be allocated. These differences among the teachers are
of little concern to the taxpayers and might be resolved by the democratic
process within the union.
However, when disciplinary rules are bargained for, the teachers may
have different and conflicting views, yet the union as exclusive
representative purports to speak with a single voice for all teachers. With
bargaining behind closed doors, the teachers who disagree will have no
opportunity to be heard. Indeed, in Madison, Wisconsin, a non-union
teacher claiming to represent an informal committee spoke at a board of
education meeting urging the board to table a mandatory dues proposal
until there had been further study and discussion. The Wisconsin court
held that the board, by allowing anyone other than the exclusive
representative to appear and speak on issues under negotiation, had
committed an unfair labor practice."
More important, because the bargaining is behind closed doors, the
negotiators for the board are the sole spokespeople for the parents and the
students who will have widely varying and conflicting views. When the
parties emerge from the bargaining room with the completed agreement,
discipline will be just one among many issues that will not be fully
discussed. The result is that a governmental decision is made on a
significant public policy with many of those most interested having no
effective voice. Unlike economic issues, there is no direct conflict between
the teachers' and the taxpayers' interests. Instead, it is a question of
educational policy which should be subject to open discussion.
The problem of collective bargaining silencing those who have a vital
interest in the subject is dramatically illustrated by examining whether the
decision to establish a public review board to inquire into cases of police
abuse should be made by collective bargaining. The general public's
interest is central; to leave it to bargaining between the police
commissioner and the police officers' union would largely ignore the wider
public's interest.
Designating a subject as bargainable means that the decision making
process has moved from the open public forum of normal political
processes to a closed forum where the union speaks for all employees. It is
a form of delegation of public decision making. Whether a subject is
considered bargainable depends on whether it is appropriate to move the
particular decision from the open political process to the closed negotiation
process. As the examples suggest, this question cannot be sensibly
answered with concepts or formulae of words, but only by examining the
12. City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. W.E.R.C., 231 N.W.2d 206 (Wis. 1995), aff'd,
429 U.S. 167 (1976).
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practical functioning of the political process. If there is any broad principal
it is that those who have a significant interest in the decision should have a
proportionate effective voice.
One might venture some general rules to be used as rough guidance.
Where the two opposing political interests-taxpayer/residents and
employees-are grossly unbalanced, collective bargaining serves to adjust
the imbalance. Where public management and the employees have
opposing interests, but taxpayers or other groups have no substantial
interests, the two interest groups can be allowed to work out their
differences collectively. However, if bargaining by the two parties shuts
out other groups that have substantial interests, depriving them of effective
voice in the decision, then collective bargaining is inappropriate. Finally, if
the employees have strongly opposing interests among themselves, then the
union ought not be able to shut out from public discussion those who have
different views.
This is an attempt to spell out a crude theoretical framework that
would guide the courts, a framework that has not been articulated by the
courts beyond the language quoted from the New Jersey Supreme Court.
However, if one is not distracted by the broad generalities typified by the
Pennsylvania statute and similar language in court opinions, one may see,
or imagine, that the courts are going in this direction. In determining
whether the transfer and assignment of teachers was bargainable in
Ridgefield, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that negotiable terms
were "those matters which intimately and directly affect the work and
welfare of the public employment which would not significantly interfere
with the exercise of inherent management prerogatives pertaining to the
determination of governmental policy.'
13
In holding that transfers and assignments were not bargainable, the
court gave some substance to this rather slippery test:
The selection of the school in which a teacher works or the grade
and subjects which he teaches undoubtedly have an appreciable
effect on his welfare. However ... this aspect of the transfer
decision is insignificant in comparison to its relationship to the
Board's managerial duty to deploy personnel in the manner
which it considered most likely to promote the overall goal of
providing all students with a thorough and efficient education.
14
The test, as stated here, is less than clear, but it should be read in
conjunction with the court's expressed concern for preserving community
involvement. 15 This can come only through the board's open political
13. See Ridgefield, 393 A.2d at 284.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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process and not through the closed collective bargaining process. What is
clear is that the limits on appropriate subjects for collective bargaining in
the public sector are governed by totally different considerations than those
in the private sector.
V. STRIKES
In private sector bargaining, the right to strike is considered
fundamental. While it may be limited in time, place, manner, and purpose,
a broad prohibition of the right to strike would be politically rejected, if not
considered unconstitutional. Even in cases of national emergency, the
Taft-Hartley Act only postpones the strike for eighty days. In the public
sector, the starting assumption is quite the opposite: that public employees
have no right to strike. A strike is sometimes characterized as a challenge
to the state's sovereignty, bordering on insurrection. Even though most
states provide by statute for public employee collective bargaining, most
states still prohibit employees from striking when their demands are
rejected. Employee recourse is solely through the political process where
their demands for higher pay are pitted against the voters' resistance to
increased taxes.
This lack of meaningful recourse frequently leads to strikes, despite
the legal prohibition against them and despite their limited effectiveness.
Putting the strike leaders in jail has sometimes meant that the public
officials have to go to the jail to negotiate a settlement. Putting striking
teachers in jail does not reopen the schools, a problem which has led to
releasing the jailed teachers during the day so that they can teach their
classes before returning to jail for the night.
Only a few states allow a limited right to strike. Pennsylvania allows
strikes, but they may be enjoined if the strike creates a "clear and present
danger or threat to the health, safety or welfare of the state. ' 6 All states
prohibit strikes by public safety employees-police, firefighters, prison
guards-but many provide for recourse to arbitration where the parties are
not able to agree, which frequently occurs.
A strike of public employees is not unlike a strike of private
employees if we recognize that the employers are the residents and
taxpayers who receive the benefit of the employees' work and pay the
employees' wages. Like all employers, they want maximum production for
minimum cost; they want more public service and lower taxes. They want
more police protection, better schools, improved streets, more rubbish
collection, and cleaner parks, while seeking a reduction in taxes at the same
time.
16. 43 PA CONST. STAT. ANN. § 1101.1003 (West 1991).
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Public sector strikes commonly have a directness of confrontation
which private sector strikes do not have. When public sector employees
strike, they confront their employers-taxpayers and users of their
services-directly with the declaration, "No services until you meet our
demands." The taxpayers and users through their elected officials respond,
"No work until you agree to our terms." The contest of wills and staying
power is direct. More important, the costs of settlement are direct. The
decision is controlled by those who use the services and pay for the
settlement.
Contrast this with many private sector strikes. If steelworkers strike,
workers in industries using steel are put out of work, but they have no voice
in whether the strike continues. The settlement affects the price of all
products using steel, but those buying these products have no voice in the
settlement. If the airlines strike, passengers must stay home, and when the
strike is settled, the passengers must pay the fare increase. But they have
no direct voice in how long the strike goes on, or in the terms of the
settlement. But if the street maintenance workers or the garbage collectors
strike, the ones jarred by the potholes or who smell the garbage have a
voice through the political process in the length of the strike and the terms
of its settlement.
There is often an unarticulated assumption that public employee
strikes are much more effective than private employee strikes, and that
government will be paralyzed and chaos will result when public employees
strike. This may be true of strikes by police, firefighters, and some other
special categories of employees, but for most public employee strikes, the
fear of paralysis or chaos is much greater than the pain of the reality. If the
public works department strikes, car drivers will just continue to be jarred
by the potholes, picnickers will go to cluttered parks, and citizens will see
public buildings deteriorate for some extra weeks. If teachers strike in
September, parents will suffer and children will enjoy an extension of
summer vacation, with the time to be made up by reducing vacations
during the year and extending school into the next summer, or substitutes
will be hired to maintain the fiction of holding classes to fulfill the required
180 days of school. If the city hall employees strike, few people will even
notice. Indeed, it is said by some public employees that they do not want to
strike because it might reveal how little they are needed.
Strikes by public employees do, of course, cause some inconvenience
and generate various degrees of economic and political pressure. However,
unlike private sector strikes, they do not cut off the income of the
employer. The city continues to collect taxes, even though it is not
providing services or paying wages and salaries. Indeed, there are
instances when a school board or a city welcomed a strike or its
continuation because it helped them to balance their budget.
2003]
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Public employee strikes function quite differently from private sector
strikes. They bring pressure directly on those who use and those who pay
for their services. These people, in turn, exert political pressure on the ones
negotiating on their behalf. At the same time, the union, perhaps with the
aid of other unions, will continue to exert political pressure on the
employers' negotiators. Unlike a strike in the private sector, a strike in the
public sector is not an economic instrument operating through the market.
It is primarily a political instrument working through the political process.
VI. CONCLUSION
These comments obviously do not canvass all of the differences
between public sector and private sector bargaining. They seek only to
point out the most fundamental difference, and how that difference affects
two important areas: the subjects of bargaining, and the use of strikes.
The law and practice of public sector collective bargaining have been
slow to recognize and react to this fundamental difference and its impact.
In part, this is because most of the lawyers who represent the parties in
public sector bargaining are the same lawyers who represent parties in
private sector bargaining. They have a tendency to carry over their ways of
thinking from the private to the public sector. The legislatures also bear a
large measure of responsibility, for they carried over the language of the
public sector statutes from the private sector. The similarity of wording has
induced a similarity of thinking.
